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I. Introduction
Asbestos liability has challenged the tort system since it
became clear that exposure to asbestos caused serious, often fatal
diseases. Professor Fraley in her Comment has, among other
trenchant observations, nicely shown how information on the
causal link was established.1 In my Comment, I wish to make
three short points that will add some context to Flinn’s fine
Note.2
First I make a few general reports from the battlefield on the
asbestos litigation wars described in the Note. The term “war” is
appropriate. Battles have been waged in the courtrooms and
legislatures over decades on behalf of claimants with devastating
diseases that are associated with exposure to asbestos fibers.
Multiple manufacturers employing the mineral have been sued.
In the ensuing imbroglio of asbestos claims, along with other
high-impact claims, medical devices, pharmaceuticals, motor
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1. See Jill M. Fraley, Comment, Knowledge Circles and the Duty of Care,
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 789, 792 (2014) (describing the uneven distribution of
knowledge regarding the toxicity of asbestos).
2. See generally Meghan E. Flinn, Note, A Continuing War with Asbestos:
The Stalemate Among State Courts on Liability for Take-Home Asbestos
Exposure, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707 (2014).
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vehicles, and other toxic substances have formed the rich tapestry
of modern torts law.3 These high-impact claims constitute the
bulk of actions and most of the damages sought by the persons in
the tort system. Tort law would be a quiet backwater except for
litigation around these high-impact claims.
Flinn shows us the high incidence of asbestos litigation, its
claim frequency, and claim severity.4 She demonstrates that after
years of battles, settlements, and the establishment of trusts
designed to afford compensation, it looked as though the war was
coming to an end.5 It may have been surmised that asbestos
litigation would yield its place in the pantheon of high-impact tort
claims. But the energy of the claims had not run its course. Like
Napoleon returning from Elba, the war is resumed. Flinn would
like to declare a Waterloo through her suggestion for quiet in
these claims.6 After these decades of litigation, it is perfectly
understandable that peace has its value and that claims coming
from exposure to asbestos brought to the home need to be brought
to a resolution.
Flinn documents that courts, when faced with these claims,
have been divided in finding liability.7 Some have decided that
liability is a step too far; others have determined that the claims
are meritorious. Flinn has stepped into the breach. Noting
carefully and exhaustively the struggles of the courts in drawing
boundaries to liability, she sees that a national legislative
response is fraught with problems.8 Acutely, she perceives that
the states have different problems in different degrees of
severity.9 Congress too has shown a penchant for logrolling10 and
3.

See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS
152 (1995) (discussing examples of products liability).
4. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 709 (providing an introduction of the
asbestos litigation crisis).
5. See id. at 709–10 (discussing the current state of asbestos litigation).
6. See id. at 757 (calling for an “end” to “this legal nightmare”).
7. See id. at 711–14 (outlining the courts’ various approaches to takehome asbestos litigation).
8. See id. at 752–53 (discussing the ways in which the federal government
has attempted to control the mass of litigation brought about by occupational
exposure to asbestos).
9. See id. at 755 (suggesting that state legislatures should respond to the
problem of asbestos litigation in accordance with their connection to it).
10. The term “logrolling” refers to a “mutual exchange of favors, especially
OF REFORM

ASBESTOS WARS

761

catering to special interests in the high-stakes game of regulating
the asbestos claims process.11 A state-by-state solution accounts
for regional differences and can measure more accurately the
issues of the class of persons who merit recovery. The federal
system, which allows states to experiment and test models for
recovery that may inspire fellow states, also supports this
solution.12 Removing of claims from state dockets is of public
importance in the context of tight public revenues. State courts
ought, in a sensitive manner, to be able to weigh claimants’
legitimate demands for compensation against the public interest
in quieting claims for asbestos-related diseases. Legislatures
have an institutional competence to regulate claims. They may
cut the Gordian knot of litigation and come to a solution that
weighs the interests more broadly. As elegant as Flinn’s solution
may be, one last gauntlet must be run. I have no doubt that some
claimants will be aggrieved and seek to mount a constitutional
challenge to the legislation. The challenge may proceed under the
United States Constitution or state constitutions.
State tort reform has gathered pace, fueled by concerns about
affordability and availability of liability insurance. Accumulating
legislation has often been challenged on the basis that it violates
state constitutional provisions.13 The Kentucky Supreme Court in
Williams v. Wilson14 adopted the notion of jural rights derived
from the common law to limit reform.15 Other courts have
nullified tort law.16
among lawmakers.” WEBSTER’S NEW POCKET DICTIONARY 189 (Johnathan L.
Goldman ed., 2000).
11. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751–53 (discussing the various congressional
attempts to handle asbestos litigation).
12. See State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
13. See, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 260 (Ky. 1998)
(considering whether a Kentucky statute that limited punitive damages violated
“one or more provisions of the Constitution of Kentucky”).
14. 972 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1998).
15. See id. at 269 (determining that the Kentucky statute on punitive
damages violated the jural rights doctrine and was therefore unconstitutional).
16. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1104 (Ill. 1997)
(declaring the Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 unconstitutional under
the Illinois constitution); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward,
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This may be particularly the case if a court agrees with the
reasoning of Professor John Goldberg, who argues from the roots
of tort liability a constitutional right in tortious recourse.17 Part
of Flinn’s plan is to place claimants in different states on
different legal footings.18 Immediately, equal protection is
implicated. I too favor a legislative solution that sets up a
tribunal, federal or state, that may deal with these and other
claims arising from asbestos exposure. Constitutional attacks will
also loom in my suggestions. The maintenance of the claims,
although in a different forum, fortifies them more robustly
against attack because individual rights are preserved. I do not
wish to pursue this point on the constitutionality of Flinn’s
institutional reform, although, as her ideas percolate, the issue
will be salient. Let me proceed to my three points.
In Part II, I stress the role of tort law as a remedial machine
that acts to force information about the causes of accidents and
diseases. The problem of ignorance is especially acute when the
law deals with the etiology of diseases. A person will have little
information that tells him or her that the cause of the disease is
tortious. Proof of negligence in accidents may sometimes call for
judicial innovation, but gaps in proof pertaining to causation are
perplexing when the injury claimed is disease. Yet, if the law of
torts is to perform its function of correcting wrongful harms and
internalizing the costs of harmful products, it is vital that tort
doctrine is so empowered. Asbestos liability was a testing ground
for judicial innovation as Flinn shows.19
715 N.E.2d 1062, 1102 (Ohio 1999) (declaring civil justice reform amendments
unconstitutional under the Ohio constitution); Lakin v. Senco Prods. Inc., 987
P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999) (declaring a cap on noneconomic damages to be an
unconstitutional violation of Oregon right to jury trial). But see McDougall v.
Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 150 (Mich. 1999) (upholding statute setting strict
requirements concerning qualifications of experts in medical malpractice cases
in face of challenge brought under Michigan’s constitution).
17. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 529
(2005) (“This Article calls for recognition of a right, grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, to a body of law that empowers individuals to
seek redress against persons who have wronged them.”).
18. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 755 (arguing that state’s statutory responses
to take-home asbestos litigation should be individualized).
19. See id. at 711–28 (discussing state courts’ various approaches to takehome asbestos liability).
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In Part III, I canvass the scope of liability question that Flinn
examines thoroughly and effectively.20 She is concerned with
elucidating the role of foreseeability in the duty of care question
and compares the Third Restatement’s Section 721 articulation of
the duty of care.22 The courts have used both lenses to ascertain
whether a duty is owed to those exposed to asbestos in the
household. The duty issue can become complex and its reasoning
circular. The duty problem I submit is a familiar one, and it runs
along recognized channels to extend a duty to family members. I
agree that the test will depend upon knowledge of the toxicity of
asbestos at the time of the exposure.23 This inevitably leads to
discussions relating to extent of warnings required for later
acquired knowledge and liability for monitoring for asbestosrelated diseases in this new class of plaintiffs.
Part IV brings us back to the courts and legislatures as
institutions dealing with the imbroglios of liability and
compensation. My point is that given the fact that tort law has
played its strong remedial function in uncovering the toxicity of
asbestos and has done the spade work in ascribing responsibility,
the task is now one of efficient claims administration. Courts are
institutionally weak in devising the machinery for claims
administration. They may attempt to set up, as in the DES
cases,24 rules for settlement, but the extent of claims in size and
numbers of claimants beggar the ability of courts. The American
court system, without legislative assistance, has struggled
mightily to cobble together a claims-making and compensation
apparatus through class actions often involving bankruptcy.25
20. See id. at 723 (highlighting the problems with extending liability in
take-home asbestos exposure cases).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010)
(eliminating analysis of foreseeability from duty analysis).
22. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 728–30 (discussing the Third Restatement’s
duty analysis).
23. See id. at 715 (explaining that in take-home asbestos cases, the
existence of duty frequently depends the date on which the exposure occurred
and whether the toxicity of asbestos was known at that time).
24. See infra note 62 (listing a few of the many cases on DES litigation).
25. See Francis E. McGovern, Distribution of Funds in Class ActionsClaims Administration, 35 J. CORP. L. 123, 129 (2009) (discussing settlement
fund distributions in personal injury cases); LLOYD DIXON, GEOFFREY MCGOVERN
& AMY COOMBE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS:
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Courts, however, are ill suited to the task, especially in a federal
system. In the best of worlds, the legislature acting for the benefit
of claimants and defendants would devise a neutral means of
claims resolution. This would mitigate the problems of
opportunistic behavior by claimants, vis-à-vis one another and by
defendants who are intent on exploiting the barriers to fair and
rational resolution in large class actions cases.26 My basic point is
that it is entirely appropriate to reward handsomely plaintiffs’
lawyers in the arduous and financially risky endeavor of
uncovering tortious behavior. Here they act as private attorneys
general.27 But it is wasteful to continue to incur the same overlay
of expenses generated by rent-seeking lawyers crimping scarce
judicial time and resources, when the function is the
administration of mature claims that calls for facilitation of
compensation and some extension of the class of persons that
might be justly compensated.28 Here a positive sum game invites
the legislature to set up an efficient resolution apparatus.
II. Asbestos: Tort As Information Forcing
The ancients were cognizant both of the benefits and hazards
of asbestos. As Professor Fraley has explained, the knowledge
AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON THE
LARGEST TRUSTS xi (2010) (reviewing bankruptcy claims of companies with
significant liability for asbestos-related injuries).
26. On this point, it is apparent that to devise a mixed system of a
compensation scheme against a continuing stream of litigation will be highly
wasteful. See David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, BP Oil Spill:
Compensation, Agency Costs, and Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341,
1360 (2011) (describing the drawbacks of compensation schemes competing
against ongoing litigation).
27. I cannot deny, however, that the rewards carry the risk of corruption of
the judicial system. See, e.g., CURTIS WILKIE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS:
THE RISE AND RUIN OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL TRIAL ATTORNEY 5 (2010)
(telling the story about Dick Scruggs, a lawyer who struck it rich in tobacco
litigation and was later indicted for bribery).
28. But modern scholars remain concerned about the inherent
inefficiencies in delivering compensation in large, complex suits. See Howard M.
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
265, 320 (2011) (“Of the roughly $7 billion Merck will have to spend on the Vioxx
litigation, approximately $3.5 billion will have been on attorneys’ fees, including
roughly $2 billion for defense litigation fees.”).
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was lost although it had come to light before the Second World
War.29 One may speculate that the fog of the Second World War,
with the exigencies of building an arsenal for democracy, blinded
industry from attending to occupational health and safety. The
exposure during this period was significant and was to manifest
itself in disease in these workers in the 1960s when they reported
asbestosis and mesothelioma.30 Legal doctrine, with its roots in
medieval times, was ill-equipped to cope with the perplexing
causation problems and the scope of class of persons suffering
from the diseases. Justice Cardozo had formulated his wide
concept of the duty of care in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,31
recognizing that in a modern industrial society, goods were
manufactured and distributed on a massive scale.32 Thus, a broad
duty was called for to fit the expectations of consumers and the
needs of society for reasonably safe products.33 A duty was to be
extended to all those foreseeably physically injured as result of a
person’s negligent act.34 The law had moved beyond confined
relationships, such as occupier–entrant or employer–employee,
from liability for inherently dangerous activities and for
adulterated food and drugs, and beyond the confines of
contractual privity.35 Nevertheless, an accident stemming from a
negligent act had a stopping point given the laws of friction. It
occurred within a manageable time frame and its causes were
observable. In MacPherson, the defective wheel in the Buick
29. See Jill M. Fraley, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University,
Commentary at the Washington and Lee Law Review Note Colloquium (Sept.
19, 2013) (describing the historical evolution of knowledge on the dangers of
asbestos).
30. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST. (May 1,
2009), http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos (last visited
Nov. 6, 2013) (describing the nature and the history and use of asbestos) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
32. See id. at 1050 (extending negligence law to machinery that, when used
dangerously, can cause injury to others).
33. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1825, 1846–47 (1998) (explaining the
breadth of MacPherson’s holding on duty with respect to products liability).
34. See id. at 1821 (describing the role of foreseeability in duty
determination envisioned by Judge Cardozo in Macpherson).
35. See id. at 1752–67 (describing the change in duty analysis occurring at
the time of MacPherson).
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would injure an obvious class of persons upon its collapse.36 In
the classic English case of Donoghue v. Stevenson,37 the snail in
the bottle of ginger beer on that warm Scottish summer day
would affect a limited class of persons in a predictable way.38 The
range of neighbors to whom a duty is owed is controllable.
Benjamin Cardozo, recall, confined the scope of liability via duty
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.39 to that class in the
vicinity of the negligent act.40 Liability dealing with human
interaction had a relational core stemming from ancient torts
cases: the squib passed in panic in Scott v. Shepherd,41 the eye
put out when the stick is swung back to separate dogs in a fight,42
or the farrier applying his skills to the care of a horse.43
Note the manifold challenges of asbestos liability. Whose
asbestos caused the disease? When did the disease first occur?
When was the disease discovered or discoverable? What if one
disease is manifested and another follows?44 What knowledge did
36. See MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051 (“Unless its wheels were sound and
strong, injury was almost certain.”).
37. [1932] A.C. 562 (Eng.); see also David Partlett, Tort Law, Revolution
and the Bible, in OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA (forthcoming 2013) (discussing
Donoghue v. Stevenson and comparing it to modern tort law and Biblical
stories).
38. See Donoghue, [1932] A.C. at 562–63 (describing the facts of the case).
39. 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
40. See id. at 100 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the
range of apprehension.”).
41. (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (K.B.); see also M.J. Prichard, Scott v.
Shepherd (1773) and the Emergence of the Tort of Negligence, Selden Society
Lecture delivered in the Old Hall of Lincoln’s Inn (July 4, 1973) (discussing the
Scott v. Shepherd case, in which the passing of a squib led to Scott losing his
eye) (transcript available in the University of Technology, Sydney, Library).
42. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 298 (1850) (determining a case in
which the defendant swung a stick to separate fighting dogs and accidentally hit
the plaintiff).
43. See DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE 17–18 (1985)
(describing negligence hypotheticals).
44. The once-and-for-all rule requires that the damage be actionable, and
once an action is brought, further actions are precluded. Cf. Joyce v. A.C. & S.,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Once a cause of action is complete
and the statute of limitations begins to run, it runs against all damages
resulting from the wrongful act, even damages which may not arise until a
future date . . . .”); Gideon v. Johns Manville, 761 F.2d 1129, 1136 (5th Cir.
1985) (“[A] plaintiff may not split this cause of action by seeking damages for
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the manufactures have of the deleterious effects of asbestos?
What other life style behaviors could have contributed to
claimant’s illness? These do not include the problems of dealing
with a large class and with severe magnitudes of damage.
Moreover, as Flinn now highlights, we are faced with new waves
of claimants stemming from the transportation of the fibers to
third parties.45 Mesothelioma, unlike asbestosis, is not a product
of constant of exposure over a long period; the cancer can arise
from a minimal exposure.46
Tort doctrine often modifies its rules to further the policies of
tort law. For example, where plaintiffs face insuperable obstacles
in proving the identity of the wrongdoer, courts will shift, in some
cases, the burden of proof to the defendants to disprove their
involvement and negligence in causing the accident.47 Thus, in
the well-known case of Ybarra v. Spangard,48 the court found
that the plaintiff’s injury arising in surgery could be inferred to
have been caused by one of the members of the surgical team.49
However, on traditional lines, the plaintiff would have failed,
faced with the burden of showing, on the balance of probabilities,
who had caused the paralysis. In some medical practice cases, the
courts have been willing to allow recovery even though the
plaintiff could not establish cause-in-fact. The classic case is
some of his injuries in one suit and for later-developing injuries in another.”). In
asbestos cases, a majority of courts have permitted a second action for cancer
where the first disease was nonmalignant, like asbestosis. See, e.g., Marinari v.
Asbestos Corp., Ltd., 612 A.2d 1021, 1028 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (allowing the
action for cancer because the disease was not discovered until 1987); Sopha v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 601 N.W.2d 627, 638 (Wis. 1999) (allowing a
second suit for newly discovered cancer but emphasizing that the case “presents
a special circumstance”).
45. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 709–10 (explaining the new wave of asbestos
litigation).
46. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 30 (explaining the
causes and development of asbestosis and mesothelioma).
47. See Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 775 n.20 (1970) (discussing
the possibility of distributing the loss over a class of defendants, specifically,
those who benefited from the “cost savings accompanying the nonemployment of
a lifeguard”).
48. 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
49. See id. at 691 (“[W]here a plaintiff receives unusual injuries while
unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants who
had any control over his body . . . may properly be called upon to meet the
inference of negligence . . . .”).
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where the patient is wrongly diagnosed but, if rightly diagnosed,
would have died anyway.50 To fulfill the deterrence and other
policy imperatives of tort law, some courts have been willing to
give damages based on the lost chance of recovery, although it
was less probable than not.51
In a line of cases, the English courts have grappled with
causation issues, attempting to overcome logical and proof
problems in establishing causation. In the early case of McGhee v.
National Coal Board,52 the pursuer, as plaintiffs are called in
Scottish cases, contracted a skin disease from exposure to dust
from the brickworks in which he worked.53 The defender was in
breach of a duty to provide showers so he could wash before
striking out for home, but the pursuer could not establish on the
balance of probabilities that going home in an unwashed state
had caused the skin disease.54 The court determined, however,
that failure to shower had materially contributed to it and that
was enough for the court to find causation.55 It was the very risk
that the installation of the showers was designed to forestall.56
The same causal dilemmas apply to asbestos when a person
is exposed to asbestos from several culpable sources. In the
English case of Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services
50. See Herskovits v. Grp. Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 479
(Wash. 1983) (“We hold that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of
survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the
proximate cause issue to go to the jury.”).
51. Note that wrongful life and wrongful birth cases illustrate strong
examples of modifying the assumptions of tort liability to the ends of promoting
deterrence and compensation.
52. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1.
53. See id. at 1 (describing the facts of the case).
54. See id. at 7–8 (stating that the pursuer “has succeeded in showing that
his injury was, more probably than not, caused by . . . the defenders’ failure to
provide a shower-bath”).
55. See id. at 2 (stating that the defendants’ failure to provide a shower
materially contributed to the skin disease).
56. See id. at 1 (explaining that the showers were meant to prevent the
skin disease); Reynolds v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694, 698 (1885)
[W]here the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the
chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have
happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain
of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.
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Limited,57 the plaintiff had contracted mesothelioma and
established that asbestos had caused his disease.58 But he could
not show along traditional lines that one employer rather than
any other was responsible.59 Accordingly, he would have to fail.
Lord Hoffman confirmed that liability should be established
where
between the employer in breach of duty and the employee who
has lost his life in consequence of a period of exposure to risk
to which the employer has contributed . . . it would be both
inconsistent with the policy of the law and morally
wrong . . . to impose causal requirements which exclude
liability.60

If some of the exposure were from a nontortious source, the
House of Lords, in a later case, found that the liability could be
apportioned according to each actor’s contribution to the risk of
contracting mesothelioma.61 This was a large step, as were the
American DES cases, in changing the rules of causation.62 The
flexibility of the rules is designed to avoid the obstacles presented
in tort doctrine that thwart the objectives of the law. In
particular, knowledge gaps are cured. These doctrinal artifices
are necessary to bolster the remedial purposes of the law.63
It is notorious that the connection between asbestos and
disease was not broadly brought to the attention of the public
until the 1960s.64 The revelation of that information, as with
57. [2002] UKHL 22.
58. Id. at [3]–[5].
59. See id. at [20] (discussing the difficulty in determining which of
cumulatively operating factors caused the injury).
60. Id. at [63].
61. See Barker v. Corus, [2006] UKHL 20, [48] (apportioning liability
among the defendants).
62. See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1071–72 (N.Y. 1989)
(reviewing the applicability of the market share theory in a suit against DES
manufacturers); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 926 (Cal. 1989)
(considering claims that defendants are jointly liable “regardless of which
particular brand of DES was ingested by plaintiff’s mother”).
63. See Dan Farber, Recurring Misses, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 727, 737 (1990)
(explaining that scholarship can “separate” rules of law, resulting in “a barrier
of intellectual inertia”).
64. See Asbestos Exposure and Cancer Risk, supra note 30 (explaining
when the danger of asbestos became understood).
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similar revelations about tobacco, owed much to tort law, inviting
the attention of plaintiffs’ lawyers and the rewards of class
actions. The law of torts has multiple purposes. An instrumental
aim, if second order purpose, is to reveal information about harm
producing products.65 Liability rules can then impose costs on
their production. The externalities that resulted in social costs
can then be accounted for or internalized. As with punitive
damages, information is often hidden, and the incentives to bring
it to light and hold wrongdoers accountable are weak. Thus, we
find that the supercompensatory damages awarded incentivize
attorneys to act in the public good; they are sometimes described
as private attorneys general.66 Without such incentives, wrongs
would not be unearthed and the purposes of the law to do justice
between citizens and inculcate community welfare would be
stillborn.67 To be sure, other organs of government may function
to reveal harm producing information, but in the United States in
particular, feckless legislatures rarely function efficiently to do
so. Private enforcement in the public interest is a preferred route.
The social benefit of illuminating the recesses of wrongfully
caused diseases cannot be denied. The expense of the tort system
too cannot be denied. Yet, unless another social institution at less
cost could reveal the information, the expense is justified.
Moreover, it is a well-established and time-honored role of tort
law to bring a measure of justice to the victims of harm-producing
products. The information-forcing function of tort law in some
cases reveals its inherent limits. The litigation process, powerful
in forcing out information, is a poor vehicle for delivering
compensation. Flinn points out that many firms have declared
bankruptcy.68 This has not been because of the enormity of the
65. Note that claimants in medical malpractice actions state that a prime
aim in litigation is to determine information about the malpractice event. See
FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 64–71 (1913)
(describing litigation goals in medical malpractice).
66. See Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.
2003) (describing the award of punitive damages as “private” prosecution); Ill.
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977) (explaining that the possibility of
bringing a treble-damages action is a “weapon of antitrust enforcement”).
67. See generally Andrew Robertson, Rights, Pluralism and the Duty of
Care, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 435 (Nolan & Robertson eds., 2012).
68. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 710 (stating that asbestos liability has been
a factor in almost 100 companies’ declaration of bankruptcy).

ASBESTOS WARS

771

damages so much as the absence of effective ways of running
class actions with their polyglot claimants and defendants avid
for peace. The bankruptcy process provides a framework in which
to accommodate the claims, work out priorities, and balance the
interests of different classes of claimants and defendants.69 No
doubt the procedures are clumsy and inefficient. They force
courts to act as administrative bodies that corrode judicial
independence and impartial distance.70 The transaction costs
generated mean that the dollars delivered to claimants come at
high cost.
In the mid twentieth century, many tort scholars despaired
of tort law as a compensation system.71 The despair prompted
them to recommend that tort law be abolished and compensation
schemes be substituted. The apogee of this development was the
adoption in New Zealand of their compensation scheme.72 The
schemes would deliver, it was claimed, compensation at less cost.
The model, however, was static and did not account for the tort
system’s power in information forcing. It assumed a frozen state
in which the claims cognizable are the run-of-mill running down
and simple accidents causing personal injuries. New Zealand did
69. The Dow Corning breast implant litigation illustrates this point. See
Chronology of Breast Implants, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/implants/cron.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just
Compensation: Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2063 (1997) (“Judge
Weinstein is of the view that victims [of mass torts] ‘deserve help from the
government not aid through a suit against private corporations.’” (citing In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1229 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir.1987) (internal brackets omitted))). See generally PETER H.
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986).
71. See David Partlett, Of Law Reform Lions and the Limits of Tort Reform,
27 SYD. L. REV. 417, 439 (2005) (discussing how mass tort litigation has “forced”
courts to administrate compensation systems).
72. See Partlett, supra note 26, at 1359 (describing the New Zealand
compensation scheme that replaced tort liability in the 1960s); GEOFFREY
PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA 69–104 (1979) (describing the debate over the
Accident Compensation Bill, which set up a government compensation
framework to reimburse victims of personal injury). For a later discussion on
the evolution and limits of the scheme, see generally Peter H. Schuck, Tort
Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187 (2008), and Stephen Todd,
Treatment Injury in New Zealand, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1169 (2011).
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not cover diseases, although this was not seen as a failing at the
time,73 and when Australia was considering a compensation
scheme, it was seriously contemplated. The dynamic aspect of
tort liability, sometimes its ugly face, is the one that delivers a
public good. But for garden-variety tracks of accidents and when
the parameters of liability are well worn, the tort system does not
have the same salience.
It follows that tort law in the asbestos imbroglio can claim
real success in revelation of information but must admit to a deep
impediment in delivering compensation.74 And just when we
thought that we were emerging from the claims agony, along
comes a new class of claimant. Like Macbeth, we see multiple
generations before us and like him, we are aghast. Flinn is right
to want to move beyond courts acting ab initio in adjudicating
claims.75 A system of compensation should draw on knowledge
painfully gained over the decades of asbestos litigation.
Unfortunately, the legislatures seem little interested in finding
efficient compensation schemes that would benefit victims and
defendants alike.
III. The Courts and the Scope of Liability
An admirable and noteworthy aspect of Flinn’s Note is her
analysis of the scope of liability issue regarding the take-home
asbestos claims.76 The discussion confirms the confused state of
the issue here, and it is consistent with the fraught state of the
law as claims on the periphery of tort law are examined. Once the
courts declared that the categories of negligence were not
73. The point is well taken if social welfare in a narrow sense is the
command. See generally THE WELFARE STATE TODAY: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY IN
NEW ZEALAND IN THE SEVENTIES (Geoffrey Palmer ed., 1977).
74. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 21–68 (2005) (highlighting the inefficiencies of litigation).
In the 1980s, the costs of compensation were estimated to be thirty-seven cents
in every dollar of compensation. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION 60 (2002).
75. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751 (stressing that the long-term solution to
take-home asbestos litigation lies in state legislatures).
76. See id. at 723 (highlighting the problems with extending liability in
take-home asbestos exposure cases).
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“closed,”77 the courts throughout the common law world have
searched for limiting principles.
We like to ridicule Baron Alderson’s warning in Winterbottom
v. Wright,78 when he endorsed the privity restriction in the duty
of care warning that if “one step why not fifty?”79 Such
pusillanimity was swept aside by bolder spirits and especially in
the twentieth century by the powerful rhetoric of the two great
common law jurists, Lord Atkin and Benjamin Cardozo.
Pandora’s Box was prized open—no longer was liability confined
to recognized, carefully defined, relationships. A broad principle
of hydraulic force was unleashed. Using the Parable of the Good
Samaritan, Lord Atkin said that the duty of care extends to one’s
neighbor.80 And who is my neighbor? It is that person who will be
foreseeably harmed by my act.81 Cardozo in MacPherson was
more pragmatic but just as broad.82 Modern manufacture and
distribution of goods demanded a responsibility to those persons
injured by negligently made products. The scope of that duty was
articulated in foreseeability terms in Palsgraf twelve years
later.83
The courts have hopelessly muddled the distinction between
duty and proximate cause or scope of duty. Of course, the mess
begins in Palsgraf itself where we have Cardozo opting for a duty
analysis84 and Andrews going for a proximate cause framework.85
77. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 619 (H.L.) (“The categories of
negligence are never closed.”).
78. (1842) 10 Meeson & Welsby 109 (H.L.).
79. Id. at 115 (“The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those
who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no reason
why we should not go fifty.”).
80. See Donoghue, [1932] A.C. 562 at 580 (“The rule that you are to love
your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour . . . .”).
81. See id. (“The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and
directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or
omissions which are called in question.”).
82. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916)
(explaining that the presence of a known danger creates a duty).
83. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928) (“The risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports
relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension.”).
84. See id. at 99–101 (applying duty analysis).
85. See id. at 101–02 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (applying proximate cause).
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Duty played its part, Cardozo said, because before causation
becomes relevant we have to ask if Mrs. Palgraf was within that
class of persons to whom a duty was owed.86 This could only be
the case if a sufficient relation existed between her and the Long
Island Railroad. That depended in turn on whether the eye of
“ordinary vigilance” would perceive the hazard.87 Duty cannot
exist in the air; it is a term of relation. Andrews, however, started
with the opposite idea. A duty is owed simply to the world at
large.88 The limits to liability are found in proximate cause and
that is a question of fact depending upon “practical politics.”89
Cardozo won the skirmish in Palsgraf but was to lose the war to
Andrews. The recently promulgated Section 7 of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts is confirmation of this. A duty is owed to exercise
reasonable care to all those to whom the conduct creates a risk of
physical harm.90 The vast majority of run-of-the-mill cases with
which negligence law is concerned are covered by the formula.
Duty is never argued in a running-down-highway case. But in
new areas of expansion, duty does play a vital part as recognized
in subsection (b) of Section 7, which allows for limitations of or
denial of duty for a countervailing principle or policy.91 In
particular, when the risk created is not physical in threatening
person or property or when the defendant has not acted but
rather has omitted to act, the question is one of the boundaries of
tort liability.92
This is why some courts, as explained by Flinn, have adopted
reasoning that the asbestos defendants have not acted but merely
86. See id. at 101 (majority opinion) (“The law of causation, remote or
proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us.”).
87. Id. at 100.
88. See id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (describing negligence as “an
act or omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of others”).
89. Id. at 103.
90. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 (2010)
(“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s
conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”).
91. See id. (allowing for a finding of no duty in the face of countervailing
policies or principles).
92. One is reminded of Prosser’s analysis of the “borderland of tort and
contract.” See W. Prosser, The Borderland of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED
TOPICS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 380 (1953) (discussing the overlap between tort and
contract).
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omitted to act in relation to asbestos brought home from work.93
As she intimates, this is a difficult line to draw. An omission is
actionable if a person has a positive duty to act in another’s
protection. Thus, the employer perceiving the danger of asbestos
may have a duty to protect family members who would be subject
to constant and deleterious contact with asbestos fibers.
Flinn suggests we accept Professor Zipursky’s criticism of
Section 794 and keep the concept of foreseeability in the duty
formula.95 Zipursky’s argument is that foreseeability has been
long accepted by the courts and that the Restatement’s “purge”96
of foreseeability does not describe actual court decisions.97 As
Torts professors know, the term is well ensconced, and students
and lawyers are much misled by it, perhaps as Comment j to
Section 7 suggests, to blind courts to more transparent
explanations of “no duty” findings.98 The use of the term may also
confuse the jury’s and judge’s roles in negligence questions.99
Many, however, remain faithful to it as Flinn points out.100 Let us
declare that it has no independent function except as a shell in
which to bring to bear the factors that the courts regard as
material in founding a duty in a particular case. The Supreme
Court of California “can on a clear day foresee forever.”101 Other
courts in the common law world have the same clairvoyance.
93. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 725 (describing cases in which the court
defined the defendant’s conduct as “nonfeasance”).
94. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty,
and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1257 (2009).
95. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (suggesting that foreseeability should
remain in duty analysis).
96. See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739,
742 (2005).
97. See Zipursky, supra note 94, at 1257 (explaining that the rejection of
foreseeability in duty analysis contradicts the common practice of most courts).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 7 cmt. j (2010)
(stating that a court must justify a “no-duty” ruling “without obscuring
references to foreseeability”).
99. See Cardi, supra note 96, at 799 (reasoning that foreseeability decisions
belong to the jury rather than the judge).
100. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (“[M]aintaining foreseeability of harm as
a factor in duty analysis conforms to the practice of most states . . . .”).
101. Sturgeon v. Curnutt, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 498, 501 (1994) (“On a clear day,
you can foresee forever.” (citing Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 830 (1989)
(attributing the thought to Bernard E. Witkin, Esq.))).
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Certainly, in asbestos claims, knowledge of the harm of asbestos
exposure is important, if not critical.102 Foreseeability is not
knowledge. Foreseeability is a comfortable word for courts to use
to decide if a duty should adhere. Can it be doubted that once
employers know of the risks posed by asbestos, it is foreseeable
that family members will be within that class of persons who will
be harmed in an entirely predictable way? Two ways present
themselves in dealing with the issue. First it may be said that
policy reasons ought to deny that duty of care extends to family.
Or one could find that the damage was not proximate or was
outside the scope of the duty. Flinn, for reasons of judicial
economy, would want the take-home asbestos actions to be
subject to summary judgment.103 The latter approach, being one
focusing on fact, is therefore the less attractive. Judge Andrews
in Palsgraf found the jury as the institution that should decide
scope in its good sense.104 Flinn would not want matters to be left
in the maw of the jury for well-articulated reasons.105 Of course,
some courts have boldly made an end run around the fact enquiry
by declaring, as a matter of law, that the damage is too remote.106
Alternatively, courts often utilize the duty concept to find no
liability in categories of cases for policy reasons. Note the
reasoning in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California.107 A
duty was found in Tarasoff where the victim was clearly

102. But see Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547
(N.J. 1982) (imposing liability without requiring proof of the defendant’s
knowledge of the toxic qualities of asbestos). This was quickly repudiated. See,
e.g., Olivo v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 895 A.2d 1143, 1158 (N.J. 2008) (“Foreseeability in
the context of a duty analysis must assess the knowledge of the risk of injury to
be apprehended.” (citation omitted)).
103. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 747 (explaining the need for courts to use
foreseeability in duty analysis so they can “quickly eliminate factually deficient
cases at summary judgment”).
104. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 105 (1928) (Andrews,
J., dissenting) (stating that the negligence question in the case should have been
submitted to the jury).
105. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751 (discussing the court’s role in take-home
asbestos cases).
106. See Petition of Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708, 725 (2d Cir. 1964)
(“Somewhere a point will be reached when courts will agree that the link has
become too tenuous—that what is claimed to be consequence is only fortuity.”).
107. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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identified.108 But a duty would not be found, later cases
emphasized, to extend to a class of persons who are merely
foreseeable.109
Flinn’s Note agrees with Kotlarsky that if Section 7 were
applied, fewer “no duty” determinations would be found.110 I, in
fact, see it the opposite way. The policy grounds are at the center
of the judge’s role. To rid the analysis of “foreseeability” may lead
to clarity in purging factual determinations from the duty issue,
thus excluding the jury. Courts may then, in duty
determinations, create precedent on policy and principles grounds
that allow summary judgments more readily. It may be noted
that the English courts have experimented in bringing policy
factors to the fore in duty determinations. The test in Anns v.
Merton London Borough Council111 talks in terms of a prima facie
duty arising where “a sufficient relationship of proximity or
neighborhood” is established and where in “reasonable
contemplation . . . carelessness . . . may . . . cause damage.”112
Then, it is a matter whether there are considerations “which
ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty.”113
The intent, as in Section 7, was to bring to the surface the real
reasoning animating the court in determining the scope of the
duty. The fate of this test has not been a happy one. Courts have
found it too mechanical, and the overt promotion of policy has not
suited later English and Commonwealth courts, which are more
accustomed to incremental advances in the domain of the law of
negligence.114 This experience seems to support Flinn’s criticism
108. See id. at 341 (stating that the defendant had told his therapist that he
was going to kill Tatiana Tarasoff).
109. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 737–38 (explaining Zipursky’s analysis of
Tarasoff). The extent of liability and its definition is well observed in a number
of cases relating to the liability of landlords for injuries due to criminal actions
of third parties on leased premises. See, e.g., Tan v. Arnel Mgmt. Co., 88 Cal
Rptr. 3d 754, 765 (2009) (concluding that the risk of violent criminal assaults on
the property was foreseeable such that the defendant landlord had a duty to
provide minimal security measures to protect tenants). For collected cases and
commentary, see VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 532–33 (12th ed. 2010).
110. Flinn, supra note 2, at 740.
111. [1978] AC 728.
112. Id. at 751–52.
113. Id.
114. In Sutherland Shire Council v. Heyman, Judge Brennan in the High
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of Section 7. I have no doubt that we have just begun the sturm
und drang on the duty formulation in Section 7. Little would
matter if the courts would keep the meaning of foreseeability
clear in their mind. It does not mean knowledge of risk. It is an
amalgamation of factors that, to be sure, incorporates knowledge
along with concerns about the costs of precaution and gravity of
the harm that might ensue. Duty determines the scope of
responsibility for a wrongful actor. It is a wide concept when the
risk pertains to physical harm but is more narrowly confined
when the interests stray from the physical, for example, to pure
economic risks and emotional distress. It will require the finding
of a special relationship where the duty is to take precautions to
protect another.115
Flinn gets the test entirely correct in her “Multi-Factored
Test.”116 I do not see, however, that Section 7 detracts from such a
test. In citing Chaisson v. Avondale Industries, Inc.,117 a case from
Louisiana, we see immediately how some courts misunderstand
‘foreseeability.”118 Knowledge of the risk will be a central factor
that nothing in the Third Restatement revokes. It goes to the
relationship that the Supreme Court of Michigan places at the
forefront.119 It will remain a critical matter, as a Pennsylvania
Court of Australia said:
It is preferable in my view, that the law should develop novel
categories of negligence incrementally and by analogy with
established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima
facie duty of care restrained only by indefinable “considerations
which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or
the class of person to whom it is owed.
[1985] 69 A.L.R. 1, 43–44.
115. See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (1976)
(stating that the relationship between a therapist and his patient “create[s] a
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another’s
conduct”).
116. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 746 (proposing a multi-factored test for
courts to apply to take-home asbestos cases).
117. 947 So. 2d 171 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
118. See id. at 183 (explaining that because the asbestos injuries occurred
after OSHA revealed the risks of household exposure to asbestos, the defendant
had knowledge of the risks).
119. See In re Certified Question from Fourteenth Dist. Ct. App. of Tex., 740
N.W.2d 206, 216 (Mich. 2007) (holding that because the plaintiff did not have a
legally significant relationship with the defendant, no duty should be imposed).
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court opines, that the consequences of take-home asbestos were
little known at the time of exposure.120 In policy terms, how could
the manufacturers have taken reasonable precautions against
such a remote risk? All this as Flinn states, is an application of
the common law.121 The Third Restatement neither adds nor
subtracts to the clarity of the test, if we are able to understand
the true nature of the duty concept.
Flinn’s Note does great service in exploring the options. As I
read her analysis, I was reminded of T.S. Eliot’s incisive
observations about our human experience:
We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our
exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the
place for the first time.122

Along these lines, I offer the sage words of Justice Michael Kirby
of the Australian High Court in Graham Barclay Oysters v.
Ryan.123 In that case, the question was whether the local and
state authorities responsible for the upkeep of lakes in which
oysters were grown were liable when contaminated oysters
caused the plaintiffs harm.124 Justice Kirby discussed the “search
for methodology for determining a duty.”125 He goes back to
Oliver Wendell Holmes in his famous lectures on his book, The
Common Law, where he found that the “general foundation of
legal liability in blameworthiness, as determined by the existing
average standards of the community, should always be kept in
mind.”126 After an examination of English and Australian
authorities over seventy years on the duty issue he opined as
follows:

120. See Hudson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No. 1991-C-2078, 1995 WL
17778064, at *4 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Dec. 12, 1995) (“[N]othing in the record
demonstrated that the defendant was on notice, prior to 1960, that an
employee’s wife was at risk of contracting mesothelioma.”).
121. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 745 (stating that the duty determination is
an application of a state’s common law, which varies from state to state).
122. T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 59 (2009).
123. (2002) 211 CLR 540.
124. See id. at [3] (discussing the plaintiff’s claim against the oyster
distributers and growers).
125. Id. at [230].
126. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 125 (1882).
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The search for such a simple formula [for determining the
existence of a duty of care] may indeed be a “will-o’-the wisp.”
It may send those who pursue it around in never-ending
circles that ultimately bring the traveller back to the very
point at which the journey began. Thus we seem to have
returned to the fundamental test for imposing a duty of care,
which arguably explains all the attempts made so far. That is,
a duty of care will be imposed when it is reasonable in all the
circumstances to do so. That is the test that Gummow J and I
adopted in our joint reasons in the recent decision in Tame v.
New South Wales . . . . Even if the approach of the other
members of the Court in that case does not do so explicitly, it
is obvious that the “touchstone” of reasonableness is
fundamental to the way in which they determined the
existence or otherwise of a duty of care.127

These are words that ought to encourage Flinn. Her analysis is
precisely a return to the common law of the duty of care as
measured by proportionality and reasonableness. The duty will
depend upon the factors she finds. Each court will have its own
assessment of the duty here in question. Over time it may be that
the duty question as a matter of law will be restricted to allow
defendants quiet in the face of these claims.
Before leaving this part of the Comment, I need to comment
on a line of cases that Flinn herself finds unconvincing and that
is a prime demonstration of how the duty analysis can be
obfuscated. This has to do with the line of cases that finds no
duty because the take-home asbestos cases are mere omissions
and not actions, nonfeasance and not misfeasance.128 These “no
duty” cases are best understood in terms of the common law
stance that there is no duty to rescue. The Priest and the Levite
passed the broken man on the road. They acted shamefully but
did not breach a duty of care even though they know their
nonchalance would cause him harm—they had not caused the
plight and continuing suffering of the person in peril.129 More
generally, there is no duty to protect another from the actions of a
third party. To find a duty to take affirmative actions to protect
127. Ryan (2002) 211 CLR at [244] (citations omitted).
128. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 724 (listing cases based on the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance).
129. See L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942)
(describing the biblical story of the priest and the Levite).
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another, one needs to establish a relationship that obliges action.
Thus, in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.,130 an opinion by
Cardozo, who had championed the broad duty of care in
MacPherson, the plaintiffs who suffered loss by fire when the
defendant had supplied water at a pressure below that contracted
for with the city could not recover.131 The defendant had simply
failed to bestow a benefit.132 That contractual failure alone could
not establish a relationship.133
In the take-home cases, there is clearly an act: a failure to
warn against the risks in distribution of asbestos. The plaintiffs
could be said to be in a class of persons that would be imperiled
by exposure. The husbands were the mere transporters of the
fibers, and if the defendants knew about the consequences of
exposure, they could have taken steps to avoid the danger. To
take the defective wheel in MacPherson134 and the scope of
liability, it could not be contended that if the breaking of the
wheel injured pedestrians they would be outside the zone of legal
protection.135 Some of the cases referred to by Flinn frame the
duty in terms of a duty to warn.136 Now this is understandable
since to impose strict liability for products that have no design or
manufacturing defects, the route to liability is through the failure
to warn.137 This invites a nonfeasance analysis, but it is a trap.
130. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
131. See id. at 899 (finding in favor of the defendants).
132. See id. (“What we are dealing with at this time is a mere negligent
omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements.”).
133. See Sutradhar v. Nat’l Env’t Research Council, [2006] UKHL 33, [2006]
4 All E.R. 490 (Eng.); Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 (Austl.).
134. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 1916)
(explaining the case’s facts).
135. Consider the foundational strict liability case, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). The defective product was a “shopsmith”
that injured the plaintiff when it ejected a piece of wood unexpectedly. Id. at
898. The plaintiff had received the product from his wife for Christmas two
years before. Id. No finding of negligence was necessary. The defendant was
strictly liable. Id. at 900. The product had a defect. Id. at 901. If the wood had
hit another, liability would have been extended to that person or to any others.
See id. at 900 (“A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects.”).
136. See, e.g., Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 374
(Tenn. 2008) (stating that the employer, who knew the dangers of take-home
asbestos, could have prevented or reduced the harm to the plaintiff).
137. Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 810 P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991)
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The class of persons in the scope of liability does not depend on
showing a special relationship as it does in negligence, where the
issue is protection against actions of third parties or natural
events.138 Rather, those within the scope of liability are all those
who will foreseeably be affected by exposure. If the product poses
dangers to a class of persons, the defendant will be liable without
a showing of negligence if the defendant knew or should have
known of the danger.139 Just as pedestrians are injured by the
breach in building an automobile with a negligently defective
wheel, the injured plaintiffs in the take-home asbestos cases are
injured by exposure to the fibers. The question may be whether
adding new layers of duty would be too burdensome, but it is the
act of the defendants in producing or using asbestos that has
resulted in the harm.
Lastly, let me suggest that the scope of liability ought to
extend to take-home asbestos victims. I recognize that liability
must be cut off somewhere, and principle and policy will dictate
where the line is to be drawn whether under the rubric of
foreseeability or the test embodied in Section 7. Flinn’s
multifactorial test is precisely on point. The one critical factor in
my view is that the class of persons to whom the duty is owed is
limited.140 The injuries arose from the injuries to the mothers and
(discussing strict liability in the context of “failure to warn”).
138. A duty to take affirmative steps to protect another from the acts of
others requires a showing of “control” with knowledge of particular risks that
eventuated. L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334, 337 (Ind. 1942). The costs
of imposing a duty of affirmative action are critical. See Hegel v. Langsam, 273
N.E. 351, 352 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1971) (refusing to place a duty on a university to
“regulate the private lives of students,” a duty that would be difficult to meet).
139. See Anderson, 810 P.2d at 559 (stating that a defendant in a strict
products liability action is liable unless the particular risk was “neither known
nor knowable” at the time the product was manufactured).
140. Recall that in Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., the New York Court of Appeals
felt compelled to draw a line as to disentitle third generation claimants from
compensation in tort. See Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co, 570 N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y.
1991) (“It is our duty to confine liability within manageable limits.”). In Chief
Justice Wachler’s opinion, the class of plaintiffs, the third generation, was
neither “exposed to the defendants’ dangerous product [n]or negligent conduct.”
Id. at 204. This line also supports the conservative ruling in Albala v. City of
New York, in which the court rejected that a duty would be owed to a child born
with “injuries suffered as a result of a preconception tort against the mother.”
Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786, 787 (N.Y. 1981); see also State of
La. ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1171 (E.D. La. 1981), aff’d,
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close family members’ exposure to the very substance that
caused injuries in the primary victims. As a physical substance,
the consequences will cease through the natural law of physics.
This may be put in terms of the zone of impact. Assuming
knowledge of the consequences of asbestos exposure, close
family would be “foreseeable” victims.
Moreover, family members of tort victims have often
warranted favorable treatment in terms of liability, even where
the injuries are of a different kind and where deterrence has
been garnered by findings of liability vis-à-vis primary
victims.141 The bystander cases in emotional distress are a prime
example. It is true that familial relationships no longer
immunize actors from tort liability to the extent they did in the
past. But the fact of relationship is still central to the
determination of the scope of liability as seen in a long line of
authority drawing the boundaries to emotional distress in the
bystander cases. Close family of primary victims form members
of the foreseeable class of persons.142 They are persons who are
particularly vulnerable to the use of a term of relation. Professor
Stapleton has emphasized this,143 and the High Court of
728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984) (discussing liability to an open-ended class in the
context of economic loss); Perre v Apand Pty. Ltd. (1999) 198 CLR 180 (Austl.)
(same); cf. Renslow v. Menonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1255 (Ill. 1977) (finding
that the defendant owed a duty in the case of a preconception tort).
141. See, e.g., Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 839 (Cal. 1989) (reviewing a
case in which the plaintiff–mother claimed emotional injury because of the
stress caused when hearing about a car accident involving her son). The earlier
case of Dillon v. Legg adopted the familial relationship as an element of
proximity to precipitate a duty of care to a bystander. See Dillon v. Legg, 441
P.2d 912, 924 (Cal. 1968) (providing recovery to a plaintiff–mother bystander).
In some cases the relationship may bring the claimant into a duty relationship
as a “direct victim.” E.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 816
(Cal. 1980).
142. Cf. Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 (Austl.); Annetts v
Australian Stations Pty Ltd. (2002) 191 ALR 449, 508 (Austl.) (comparing the
husband-wife relationship in Tame to the parent–child relationship in Annetts).
143. See generally Jane Stapleton, The Golden Thread at the Heart of Tort
Law: Protection of the Vulnerable, 24 AUSTL. BAR REV. 135 (2003); Jane
Stapleton, Duty of Care Factors: a Selection from the Judicial Menus, in THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JOHN FLEMING 59, 70–80, 83–87
(1998); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care: Peripheral Parties and Alternative
Opportunities for Deterrence, 111 LQR 301, 303, 305, 331, 342, 345 (1995); Jane
Stapleton, In Restraint of Tort, in THE FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 83, 92–93 (1994);
Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: a Wider Agenda, 107 LQR 249,
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Australia has adopted it.144 The protection given to children is a
prime example of the treatment of the vulnerable by the law of
negligence.145 Given knowledge on the part of asbestos producers
of the consequences of asbestos exposure, to find family members
are owed a duty fulfills the deterrence aims of the law and
compensates victims who can, without a doubt, establish
causation.146
In any event, if the courts are the institutions to continue to
seek to draw liability lines in these new asbestos cases, Flinn’s
points will be taken as important departure points for judicial
endeavors in finding suitable boundaries for the scope of liability.
My contribution is to begin to suggest some other lines of analysis
that may bring these take-home cases into the category of
compensable exposure events. My next Part is again inspired by
Flinn’s suggestion that state legislatures need to pick up the
mantle of reform.
IV. Asbestos, the Courts, and Legislatures
Flinn describes the failures of Congress in promoting a
claims and compensation scheme that would tackle the obstacles
in the way of administering asbestos claims.147 Legislatures may
266ff (1991).
144. See Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, [27] (discussing the
concept of vulnerability); Harriton v Stephens (2006) 26 CLR 52 n.156 (same);
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1, [218] (same); Cole v S.
Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd. (2004) 217 CLR 469, [106]
(same).
145. See J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924, 934 (N.J. 1998) (imposing a duty on
the wife of a child abuser to protect young girls who her husband abused).
146. The development of the elements of foreseeability in these cases into a
rigid test as in Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 839 (Cal. 1989), is, however, to
be regretted. The flexible use of factors under a general duty rubric as in the
English and Australian cases is to be preferred in putting the law on principled
foundations. See Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317 (Austl.); Annetts
v Australian Stations Pty Ltd. (2002) 191 ALR 449, 505 (Austl.) (explaining that
factors, such as causation or foreseeability, are not “themselves decisive of
liability”). It is plain enough that the California Supreme Court in Thing was
attempting to provide bright line tests to promote administrative efficiency, just
as Flinn suggests her bright line test to preclude liability in take-home asbestos
cases.
147. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 751–53 (discussing Congress’s several
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be “the better angels”148 and act in aid of resolution of claims, but,
in light of experience, the hope is dim. Most recently, trusts set
up to compensate the victims of asbestos diseases faced the
Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act 2013 (FACT),149
which allowed asbestos companies to demand information from
funds for any reason.150 Combating fraud has been put forward as
the basis of the legislation. This is the kind of legislative rentseeking action that leaves little room for responsible
Congressional initiatives designed to attack the issue so well
described in the Note.151 The hard work will fall again to the
courts, and Flinn’s Note will be a superb roadmap for courts
tackling the latest instance of the asbestos wars.
Efficiency and fairness favor a workers’ compensation type
scheme that would deliver compensation. I have pointed out the
waste in running asbestos claims through stressed courts and
aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers.152 The social benefits of the tort
litigation system in information revelation were delivered long
ago. Now, in a world of mature claims, the question is how to
compensate victims.153
attempts to handle asbestos litigation).
148. President Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861).
149. H.R. 982, 113th Cong. (2013).
150. See id. (requiring trusts to publicly disclose information regarding the
receipt and disposition of claims for injuries based on asbestos exposure).
151. For a detailed analysis of the operation of trusts set up as result of
bankruptcy and tort claims, see DIXON, ET AL., supra note 25.
152. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial
waste generated by asbestos litigation).
153. To be sure, compensation schemes have not fared well in the United
States. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An
Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and
Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 277–78 (2013) (discussing the failure of
comprehensive federal tort reform). For example, nonfault motor vehicle
accident schemes found favor in the 1970s despite their efficiency founder. See
id. at 284 (stating that in the motor vehicle industry, products liability law
developments had “no impact on passenger car-death rates between 1950 and
1988”). Nonfault medical accidents schemes have fitful appearances in the
legislative agenda. See, e.g., Joanna Shepherd-Bailey, Patient Injury Act
Increases Patient Access to Justice, THE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202620381111&slret
urn=20131016103555 (last visited Nov. 16, 2013) (discussing the Patient Injury
Act, recently introduced to the Georgia Senate, which would “eliminate the
state’s medical malpractice system and replace it with a no-blame,
administrative model that compensates all patients who have been truly
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With respect to mass torts, courts are stretched and pulled to
arrive at satisfactory solutions. At one time, we worried that the
integrity of the courts would suffer when put to the task of
administering these large mass claims.154 Class actions bring in
their wake huge devotion of judicial resources and compromises
on the idea of individual justice.155 What we hope for is a
partnership between courts and legislatures that recognizes the
limits of courts’ institutional competence and willingness of
legislatures to aid the task to bring fair and just resolution of
claims. But the stakes are large, and public choice theory gives us
little hope that the public good is a prime and independent value.
Experience here, as Flinn recognizes, does not make one sanguine
about the cooperation of the two arms of government. Law reform
to cure the limitations of courts is rarely on display. She sees that
state legislatures may reflect the policy imperatives of claims
experiences in regions in the United States.156 Each state can act
as a laboratory in exploring resolutions driven in part by a sense
of the urgency of claims against the embattlement of asbestos
producers. However, the stakes are big and the reach of selfinterest considerable. The reforms cited by Flinn are often to
protect from liability those property owners whose residences
contain asbestos. No doubt insurers are intent to limit liability of
property owners, particularly if residential owners are often seen
harmed”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also Joanna
Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical Liability
System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151 (2014) (surveying the costs of defensive medicine).
154. See Goldberg, supra note 70, at 2034–50 (comparing Judge Jack
Weinstein’s low damage amounts to tort law and distributive justice); Martha
Minow, The Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2010–25 (1997)
(describing Judge Jack Weinstein’s activist efforts to include all potentially
affected parties in class litigation, calling it the “temporary administrative
agency”); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 899, 899–930 (1996) (arguing that the rise of massive tort settlements
mimics the development of public administrative agencies).
155. See Zipursky, supra note 94, at 1270 (“It does not seem consonant with
current ideas of justice or morality that for an act of negligence, however slight
or venial, which results in some trivial foreseeable trivial damage the actor
should be liable for all consequences, however unforeseeable and however
grave . . . .”).
156. See Flinn, supra note 2, at 755 (proposing that a state should respond
to asbestos in the way that relates to that state’s experience with asbestos
claims).
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as poor loss bearers. The overhang of liability with respect to property
is felt to be real if conveyances of property are encumbered.157
Legislatures certainly may reflect exhaustively on the pros and cons
of liability but are subject to blindness towards those interests not
well represented in the lobbying market place. As I mentioned above,
varying state liability systems bring their own uncertainties.158 The
peace sought may not be easily gained. Instead, I offer a legislative
scheme that does not preclude liability and does not attempt to
import a compensation scheme.
One modest reform would be along the lines of the Australian
State of New South Wales. Under that state’s Dust Diseases Act,159 a
tribunal is established to adjudicate claims for these diseases.160 Such
legislation would be difficult to attack and would bring relief to hardpressed courts. If federal legislation were sought, a constitutional
issue might arise, but the impact of asbestos on interstate trade may
be sufficient to pass muster under the Commerce Clause. The great
advantage of the tribunal would be its expertise in these claims and
its ability as a repeat player to do justice across like-placed
claimants.161 Flinn’s central issue of the extension of liability to takehome claimants would still be a much debated matter that would find
its way into the courts. Those courts, however, would have the
advantage of growing adjudication within the tribunal that would be
a firm guide to courts.

157. This is similar to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which places absolute liability on
generators of hazardous substances on land. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.7 (2013).
CERCLA’s standard of liability imposes significant burdens on land conveyance.
See John Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1493, 1494 (1994) (describing the standard of liability).
158. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text (discussing the problems
with state-specific solutions).
159. Dust Diseases Act 2005 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
160. See id. (“An Act to provide more expeditious remedies for those
suffering from disabilities resulting from exposure to dust; and for other
purposes.”).
161. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein,
Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L.
REV. 908, 975 (1989) (proposing tort reform that would allow for consistent
recovery among plaintiffs).
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V. Conclusion

I hope that as policy makers and courts are seized again with
the claims that Flinn’s Note focuses on, they will absorb the wisdom
within her Note. Courts should be informed by her analysis of the
duty of care and the scope of duty. It will, I anticipate, yield
responses such as mine. Legislatures should visit reform with open
eyes, seeking a partnership with courts in solving the problems
presented by genuine claimants and hard-pressed defendants.
Progress is uncertain where legislation is subject to the slings and
arrows of interest groups’ influence, and we should not be overly
sanguine about progress.162 But before we succumb to the Slough of
Despond,163 we should bear in mind the remarkable success of tort’s
remedial machine.
Allow me to provide one reflection on how far we have come in
the “few” years I have been teaching torts. At the Australian
National University in the late 1970s, I was teaching a class and
mentioned the emerging litigation on asbestos. After the class a
student came to me and asked some questions. He had grown up in
an asbestos mining town in the west of Australia. As a young boy,
with his friends, he had played in the company-provided
playground: instead of sand in the play area, the company had laid
down blue asbestos.
162. Reform of adjectival law has fared badly in the United States because
courts were left with the task of applying tort doctrines of damages as once-andfor-all and limitation periods to the etiology of asbestos diseases. See, e.g.,
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales, 761 F.2d 1129, 1137 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Gideon
could not split his cause of action and recover damages for asbestosis, then later
sue for damages caused by such other pulmonary disease as might develop, then
still later sue for cancer should cancer appear.”); Metro-N. Commuter v.
Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 438 (1997) (denying recovery for medical monitoring for
future injuries resulting from asbestos exposure).
Compare this with the active cooperation of the courts and Parliament
elsewhere: Where the courts in the United Kingdom have found that the
precursors to lung disease caused by asbestos had not blossomed into a
cognizable injury, Parliament acted to redefine the conditions—for example,
pleural plaques qualify as injuries. The statutes also address the problems in
the limitation period caused where a condition remains undiscovered or
undiscoverable. See Damages (Asbestos-Related Conditions) (No. 2) Bill, 200910, H.L. Bill [31] (Eng.) (stating that someone suffering from pleural thickening
would not have to prove causation to claim damages); Damages (Asbestosrelated Conditions) (Scotland) Act, 2009, (A.S.P. 4) (allowing actionable harm for
asbestos-related pleural plaques); Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) Act
(Northern Ireland), 2011, c. 28 (same).
163. See generally JOHN BUNYAN, PILGRIM’S PROGRESS (1678).

